- Packages
- kunstmaan/media-bundle, kunstmaan/bundles-cms
- Fixed in
- 7.3.2
- Published
- Wed 7 Oct 2026, 19:05 LisbonUpdated Mon 26 Oct 2026, 03:26 Lisbon
- Installs on Packagist
- 138K
In plain words
An authenticated backend user with access to the admin media section can bypass the upload extension blacklist and upload a file that the web server executes as PHP. If the server executes scripts in the web-accessible media upload directory, this allows arbitrary code execution as the web server user. The uploaded file can then be reached over HTTP without authentication.
Affected versions
| Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| kunstmaan/media-bundle | < 7.3.2 | 7.3.2 |
| kunstmaan/bundles-cms | < 7.3.2 | 7.3.2 |
Am I affected?
Check composer.lock for kunstmaan/media-bundle or kunstmaan/bundles-cms below 7.3.2. If present, check who has access to the admin media section and whether the web server executes scripts in the media upload directory. Version 7.3.2 fixes the flaw but does not rename existing files, so audit that directory for files with executable extensions.
What to do
Check which version you have, then update to a fixed release for your branch (7.3.2):
composer show kunstmaan/media-bundle | grep versions
composer update kunstmaan/media-bundle
If your version constraint in composer.json keeps you below a fixed release, raise it first. Whether your configuration is affected, and the exact version ranges, are in the advisory itself.
If you cannot update yet
If you cannot upgrade, configure the web server to refuse to execute scripts in the media upload directory, for example using a location block in nginx or php_flag engine off in Apache.
The advisory's description
Summary
The MediaBundle blocks dangerous upload extensions with a blacklist that was matched
case-sensitively, while the stored filename was lowercased afterwards. A file uploaded
as webshell.pHp therefore bypassed the blacklist and was written to the web-accessible
upload directory as webshell.php, where the web server executed it. Any authenticated
backend user with access to the media section could obtain remote code execution.
Details
FileHandler::getFilePath() rewrote blacklisted extensions to .txt using a
case-sensitive regex, and only then lowercased the extension when building the stored
name — so the check ran against the attacker-controlled casing and the normalisation
happened after it.
Two further weaknesses contributed:
- The default blacklist contained only
phpandhtaccess, leaving other server-executable extensions (phtml,php5,phar,shtml,cgi, …) unblocked regardless of casing. - Configured blacklist values were interpolated into the regex unescaped.
Impact
An authenticated user with access to the admin media section can upload a file that the web server executes as PHP. The uploaded file is reachable over HTTP without authentication, giving arbitrary code execution as the web server user.
Patches
Fixed in kunstmaan/media-bundle 7.3.2. The extension is now normalised before it is
checked and compared with in_array(); the default blacklist is expanded to the full
set of server-executable extensions; and a new opt-in allowed_extensions option allows
projects to enforce a strict allow-list.
Note that the patch does not rename files already stored on disk. Sites should audit their media upload directory for existing files with an executable extension.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, configure the web server to refuse to execute scripts in the
media upload directory (for example a location block in nginx or php_flag engine off
in Apache).
Weakness: CWE-434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type. Reported by N0fl0w, acrobat.
The advisory
- GitHub Advisory Database: GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq, with who is affected and how
- OSV.dev: GHSA-p279-5wcv-45vq
- The week's digest, with the other advisories from 5 Oct 2026
- All advisories for kunstmaan/media-bundle
- All advisories for kunstmaan/bundles-cms